Introduction
Aliens are a fictional bloodthirsty species from deep space that reproduce as parasites. Aliens lay eggs that release araneomorph creatures (facehuggers) when a potential host comes near. The facehugger slides a tubular organ down the victim's throat, implanting a larva in the victim's stomach.
Within a matter of hours the larva evolves into a chestburster and emerges, violently killing the host; chestbursters develop quickly and the cycle restarts.
Just as Aliens, rootkits, worms, trojans and viruses penetrate healthy systems and, once in, alter the host's phenotype or destroy its contents. Put differently, malware covertly inhabits seemingly normal systems until something triggers their awakening.
As illustrated recently [4] , detecting new malware species may be a nontrivial task. In theory, the easiest way to exterminate malware is a disk reformat followed by an os reinstallation from a trusted distribution cd. This relies on the assumption that computers can be forced to boot from trusted media.
However, most modern pcs have a flash bios. This means that the codecomponent in charge of booting has been recorded on a rewritable memory chip that can be updated by specific programs called flashers or, sometimes, by malware such as the cih (Tchernobyl) virus.
Hence, a natural question arises:
How can we ascertain that malware did not re-flash the bios to derail disk reformatting attempts and simulate their successful completion?
Flash smart cards 1 are equally problematic. Consider a sim-card produced by Alice and sold empty to Bob. Bob keys the card. Alice reveals an os code but flashes a malware simulating the legitimate os. When some trigger-event occurs 2 the malware responds (to Alice) by revealing Bob's keys. This note describes methods allowing Bob to check that sims bought from Alice contain no malware. Bob's only assumption is that his knowledge of the device's hardware specifications is correct.
In biology, the term Alien refers to organisms introduced into a foreign locale. Alien species usually wreak havoc on their new ecosystems -where they have no natural predators. In many cases, humans deliberately introduce matching predators to eradicate the alien species. This is the approach taken here.
Related topic: What we try to achieve differs fundamentally from program competitions for the control of a virtual computer, such as Core War. Here the verifier cannot see what happens inside a device and seeks to infer the machine's state given its behavior.
The Arena
We tested the approach on Motorola's 68hc05, a very common eight-bit microcontroller (more than five billion units sold). The chip's specifications were very slightly modified to better reflect the behavior of a miniature pc.
The 68hc05 has an accumulator A, an index register X, a program counter PC (pointing to the memory instruction being executed), a carry flag C and a zero flag Z indicating if the last operation resulted in a zero or not. We denote by ζ(x) a function returning one if x = 0 and zero otherwise (e.g. ζ(x) = 2
−x
). The platform has ≤ 2 16 = 65536 memory bytes denoted
Any address a ≥ is interpreted as a mod . We model the memory as a state machine insensitive to power-off. This means that upon shut-down, execution halts and the machine's ram is backed-up in non-volatile memory. Reboot restores ram, resets A, X, C and Z and launches execution at address 0x0002 (which alias is start).
The very first ram state (digital genotype) is recorded by the manufacturer in the non-volatile memory. Then the device starts evolving and modifies its code and data as it interacts with the external world.
The machine has two i/o ports (bytes) denoted In and Out. Reading In allows a program to receive data from outside while assigning a value to Out displays this value outside the machine. In and Out are located at memory cells M[0] and M [1] respectively. Out's value is restored upon reboot (In isn't). If the device attempts to write into In, execute In or execute Out, execution halts.
The (potentially infested) system pretends to implement an os function named Install(p). When given a string p, Install(p) installs p at start. We do not exclude the possibility that Install might be modified, mimicked or spied by malware. Given that the next reboot will grant p complete control over the chip, Install would typically require some cryptographic proof before installing p.
We reproduce here some of the 68hc05's instructions (for the entire set see [3] ). β denotes the function allowing to encode short-range jumps
The seventh bit of k indicates if k mod 128 should be regarded as positive or negative, i.e.
Quines as Malware Predators
A Quine (named after the logician Willard van Orman Quine) is a program that prints a copy of its own code [1, 2] . Writing Quines is a tricky programming exercise yielding Lisp, C or natural language examples such as:
char *f="char*f=%c%s%c;main(){printf(f,34,f,34,10);}%c"; main() {printf(f,34,f,34,10);} Copy the next sentence twice. Copy the next sentence twice.
We start by loading a Quine into the tested computer. The device might be under the malware's total spell. The malware might hence neutralize the Quine or even analyze it and mutate (adapt its own code in an attempt to fool the verifier). As download ends, we start a protocol, called phenotyping, with whatever survived inside the platform.
Phenotyping will allow us to prove (Section 5) or assess the conjecture (Section 4) that the Quine survived and is now in full control of the platform. If the Quine survived we use it to reinstall the os and eliminate itself; otherwise we know that the platform is infected. As we make no assumptions on the malware's malefic abilities, there exist extreme situations where decontamination by software is impossible. A trivial case is a malware controlling the i/o port and not letting anything new in. Under such extreme circumstances the algorithms presented in this note will only detect the malware but will be of no avail to eliminate it.
The underlying idea is that, upon activation, the Quine will (allegedly!) start dumping-out its own code plus whatever else found on board. We then prove or conjecture that the unique program capable of such a behavior, under specific complexity constraints, is only the Quine itself.
In several aspects, the setting is analogous to the scenario of Alien vs. Predator, where a group of humans (os and legitimate applications) finds itself in the middle of a brutal war between two alien species (malware, Quine) in a confined environment (68hc05).
Space-Constrained Quines
We start by analyzing the simple Quine given below (Quine1.asm). This 19-byte program inspects = 256 bytes platforms. Quine1 is divided into three functional blocks separated by artificial horizontal lines. First, a primitive command dispatcher reads a byte from In and determines if the verifier wants to read the device's contents (In = 0) or write a byte into the ram (In = 0).
As the program enters print the index register is null. print is a simple loop causing 256 bytes to be sent out of the device. As the loop ends, the device re-jumps to start to interpret a new command.
The store block queries a byte from the verifier, stores it in M[X] and rejumps to start. s 1 = 0x00 0x00 0xBE 0x00 0x26 0x09 0xE6 0x00 0xB7 0x01 0x5C 0x26 0xF9 0x20 0xF3 0xB6 0x00 0xE7 0x00 0x20 0xED For all practical purposes, this modification (Quine2.asm) 4 has nearly no effect on the program's behavior: instead of printing s 1 , this code will print: s 2 = 0x00 0x00 0xBE 0x00 0x26 0x0B 0x3D 0x06 0xE6 0x00 0xB7 0x01 0x5C 0x26 0xF9 0x20 0xF1 0xB6 0x00 0xE7 0x00 0x20 0xEB M[23], . .
. , M[255]
Let Quine3 be Quine2 where tst is replaced by inc. When executed, inc will increment the memory cell at address label which is precisely inc's own opcode. But since inc's opcode is 0x3C, execution will transform 0x3C into 0x3D which is... the opcode of tst.
All in all, φ 2 does not allow to distinguish a tst from an inc present at label, as both Quine2 be Quine3 will output s 2 .
The subtlety of this example shows that a microprocessor-Quine-phenotyping triple {µ, Q, φ} rigorously defines a problem:
Given a state machine µ find a state M (malware) that simulates the behavior of a state Q (legitimate os) when µ is subject to stimulus φ (phenotyping).
Security practitioners can proceed by analogy to the assessment of cryptosystems which specifications are published and submitted to public scrutiny. If an M simulating Q with respect to φ is found, a fix can either replace Q or φ or both. Note the analogy: Given a stream-cipher µ and a key Q (defining an observed cipher-steam φ), prove that the key Q has no equivalent-keys M . An alternative solution, described in the next section, consists in proving the Quine's behavior under the assumption that the verifier is allowed to count clock cycles (state transitions if µ is a Turing Machine). It is impossible to modify two memory cells in seven cycles as all instructions capable of modifying a memory cell require at least four cycles. Hence we are assured that between successive reboots, the only memory changes are in Out. This means that no matter what the examined code is, this code has no time to mutate in seven cycles and necessarily remains invariant between reboots.
Time-Constrained Quines
The instructions other than sta and stx capable of modifying directly Out are: ror, rol, neg, lsr, lsl, asl, asr, bset, bclr, clr, com, dec and inc. Hence, it suffices to select v 2 = dir(v 1 ) and v 3 = dir(v 2 ), where dir stands for any of the previous instructions 6 , to ascertain that Out is being modified by an sta or an stx (we also need v 1 = v 2 = v 3 to actually see the transition).
As reading or computing with a memory cell takes at least three cycles there are only four cycles left to alter the contents of Out; consequently, the only sta and stx instructions capable of causing the transitions fast enough are: I 2 ∈ sta Out stx Out sta ,X stx, X To aim at Out (which address is 0x0001), sta ,X and stx ,X would require an X=0x01 but this is impossible (if the code takes the time to assign a value to X it wouldn't be able to compute the transition's value by time). Hence, we infer that the code's structure is: There is no way to further refine the analysis without more experiments, but one can already guarantee that as the execution of any of these fragments ends, the machine's state is either 
, reboot, wait fourteen cycles; witness the transition 7 0x10 0x02 0xBE; power-off before the fifteenth cycle completes. -Latch In ← v 6 = 0x04, reboot, wait fourteen cycles; witness the transition 8 0xBE 0x06 0xF6; power-off before the fifteenth cycle completes.
As v 5 = dir(v 4 ) and v 7 = dir(v 6 ) the second transition is, again, necessarily caused by some member of the sta or stx families and, more specifically 9 one of the following:
7 v 5 = 0xBE is the opcode of ldx, read from address 0x02 8 v7 = 0xF6 is the opcode of lda ,X, read from address 0x06 9 taking timing constraints into account and ruling-out stx ,X who can only cause an Out = 0x01, a value never witnessed.
I 4 ∈ sta Out stx Out sta ,X I 3 cannot be an instruction that has no effect on X and A as this will either inhibit a transition or cause a transition to zero (remember: immediately before the execution of I 3 the machine's state is either S A or S X ). This rules-out eighteen jump instructions as well as all cmp, bit, cpx, tsta and tstx variants. lda i and ldx i are impossible as both would have forced 0x02 and 0x04 to transit to the same constant value.
In addition, v 5 = dir(v 4 ) implies that I 3 cannot be a dir-variant operating on A or X, which rules-out negx, nega, comx, coma, rorx, rora, rolx, rola, decx, deca, dec, incx, inca, clrx, clra, lsrx, lsra, lslx, lsla, aslx, asla, asrx and asra altogether.
As no carry was set, we sieve-out sbc and adc whose effects will be strictly identical to sub i and add i (dealt with below).
add i, sub i, eor i, and i and ora i are impossible as the system 0x02 x=0xBE 0x06 x=0xF6 has no solutions when operator is substituted by +, −, ⊕, ∧ or ∨. The only possible I 3 candidates at this point are:
I 3 ∈ sub ,X and ,X eor ,X ora ,X add ,X lda, X ldx ,X
But before the execution of I 3 the machine's state is:
The ",X" versions of sub, and, eor, ora and add are impossible because:
-if the device is in state S A we note that 0x06 0x06 = 0xF6 for ∈ {−, ∨, ⊕, ∧ +} -and if the device is in state S X we note that A − opcode(sub, X) = 0x00 − 0xF0 = 0x10 = 0xF6 A ∧ opcode(and, X) = 0x00 ∧ 0xF4 = 0x00 = 0xF6 A ⊕ opcode(eor, X) = 0x00 ⊕ 0xF8 = 0xF8 = 0xF6 A ∨ opcode(ora, X) = 0x00 ∨ 0xFA = 0xFA = 0xF6 A + opcode(add, X) = 0x00 + 0xFB = 0xFB = 0xF6 ldx ,X is impossible as it would have caused a transition to opcode(ldx, X) = 0xFE = 0xF6 (if S X ) or to 0x06 (if S A ).
I 3 is hence identified as being necessarily lda ,X.
It follows immediately that I 4 = sta Out and that the ten register-A-type candidates for {I 1 , I 2 } are inconsistent.
The phenotyped code is thus one of the following two:
ldx In ldx ,X stx Out lda ,X sta Out
Only the leftmost is capable of causing the observed transition 0x02 0xBE.
All in all, we have built a proof that the device actually executed the fragment presented at the beginning of this section. and subjecting the chip to three additional experiments, we observe:
In ← 0x0A ⇒ 0x5C 0x0A 0x26
In ← 0x0B ⇒ 0x26 0x0B 0xFA
Note that the identified code "happens to" allow the verifier to inspect with absolute certainty the platform's first 256 bytes. The rest is clear. The verifier does a last time measurement, allowing the Quine to print the device's first 256 bytes (power-off as soon as the last bne iteration completes, to avoid falling into the jaws of Aliens hiding beyond address 0x000B).
It remains to check the Quine's payload (code between 0x000C and 0x00FF) and unleash the Quine's execution beyond address 0x000B. Quine won the game.
Questions
This work raises a number of intriguing questions: Is it possible to prove security using only space constraints? In the negative, can we modify the assembly language to allow such proofs
10
? Can space-constrained Quines solve spacecomplete problems to flood memory instead of receiving random data?
Another interesting challenge consists in developing a time-constrained Quine whose proof does not require rebooting but the observation of one long succession of transitions. We conjecture that such programs exist. A possible starting point might be a code (not necessarily located at start) similar to: Here the idea is that the verifier will feed the Quine with values chosen randomly in a specific set (to rule-out dir-variants) to repeatedly explore the code's immediate environment until some degree of certainty is acquired 11 
.
If possible, this would have the advantage of making the Quine a function automatically insertable into any application whose code needs to be authenticated. Moreover, if we manage to constrain the capabilities of such a Quine, e.g. not allow it read data beyond a given offset 12 , we could offer the selective ability to audit critical program parts while preserving the privacy of others. For instance, the code of an accounting program could be audited while secret signature keys would provably remain out of the Quine's reach.
Finally, as time-constrained phenotyping is extremely quick (a few clock cycles), preserves nearly all the platform's data and requires only table lookups and comparisons, we currently try to extend the approach to more complex microprocessors and implement it between chips in motherboards.
